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BAR BRIEFS
CASE NOTES
CONSTITUTIONAL LAw-RIGHT OF DEFENDANT IN CRIMINAL ACTIONS TO
ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL. "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall
enjoy the right . . . to have the assistance of Counsel for his defense"--in
such broad language speaks the Constitution of the United States, in its
Sixth Amendment, in guaranteeing to the people of the United States their
immunity against ever being forced into the undesirable position of standing
alone before the bar, accused of committing an offense against the laws of
the nation, without having at their side, if desired, a trained and competent
officer of the court, one who has been initiated into the intricacies of court-
room procedure, to assist and guide them in the preparation of their
defense.
It is to the credit of the early American colonists, as well as to the
Constitution makers who followed their lead, that they rejected the common
law rule existant in England when they first set up their own constitutions,
declarations of rights and statutes. This common law rule, as stated in
Powell v. Alabama, 287 US 45, (1932) was that "a person charged with
treason or felony was denied the aid of counsel, except in respect of legal
questions which the accused himself might suggest. At the same time parties
in civil cases and persons accused of misdemeanors were entitled to the full
assistance of counsel." See Holdsworth, History of English Law, Vol. III, p.
616, Vol. IX, p. 224. This rule was bitterly decried by notable leaders of the
legal profession including Blackstone until England by statutes in 1688 and
1836 amended its law to extend the privileges of a full defense to cases
involving treason and felonies respectively.
In at least twelve of the thirteen original colonies, the right of an
accused to counsel in a trial of any criminal charge was fully recognized
(Powell v Alabama (US) supra), although in one or two instances the right
was, and still is conferred in capital cases only. Thus in McDonald v. Com.
(1899) 173 Mass 322, 53 NE 874, (affirmed on other grounds in (1901) 180
US 311, 21 S Ct 389) it was stated by the court that the constitutional
guaranty extended in Massachusetts only to Indictments formurder.
However, it is now generally the law in the United States, both under
Federal and State Constitutions as supplemented by statutes, that an
accused is guaranteed the right to have the assistance of counsel at his
trial. 84 L Ed 384 (Annotation, Federal Cases).
Many states do not provide the sweeping guaranty of assistance of
counsel to all defendants in criminal prosecutions that appears in the
Sixth Amendment and thus secures the right in Federal Courts. And, as
stated in Betts v. Brady, 316 US 455, (1941) the Sixth Amendment applies
only to trials in Federal Courts, and, further, that the view that the Four-
teenth Amendment made the Sixth applicable to the states has never been
accepted by a majority of the court, although such has been the basis for
many dissents. However, the Fourteenth Amendment does prohibit the
conviction and incarceration of one whose trial is offensive to the common
and fundamental ideas of fairness and right, and while want of counsel
in a particular case may result in a conviction lacking in such fundamental
fairness, we cannot say that the amendment embodies an inexorable com-
mand that no trial for any offense, or in any court, can be fairly conducted
and justice accorded a defendant who is not represented by counsel. (Betts
v. Brady (US supra)
The court, in the a~bve cited case, refute the theory that the right of
accused to assistance of counsel in criminal prosecutions was fundamental.
That point was the basis of decision in Powell v. Alabama, supra, and is the
foundation on which the dissenting opinion of Justice Black is built in Betts
v. Brady (supra). Justices Douglas and Murphy joined in that dissent on
the ground that if the FOurteenth Amendment did not make the Sixth
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applicable to states, that then the right should be viewed as fundamental,
one that cannot be vitiated by judicial decree.
Again in Carter v. Pcople of State of Illinois, 67 S Ct 216, (1946) these
three Justices, joined by Justice Rutledge, dissented from the decision of
the majority of the court that the petitioner's constitutional rights had
not been violated. In that action, the petitioner in 1945 sought his release
from prison on a writ of error to the Supreme Court of Illinois, after having
been sentenced to prison for 99 years for murder in 1928 upon his plea of
guilty to the indictment therefor. His petition is based on the contravention
of his constitutional right to assistance of counsel alleged to be guaranteed
him under the Fourteenth Amendment. The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed
the original conviction and the matter was brought before the Supreme
Court of the United States on writ of certiorari granted in 382 US-, 6O
S Ct 1009 (1946). The facts of the case, resulting in the conviction of
murder, were as follows:
Petitioner, a Negro, was 30 years of age at the time of the relevant
events in 1928. He had no schooling, although he was able to read
and write. He was of average mentality and had never before run
afoul of the law. During the preceding eleven years he had worked
as a cook and a mechanic. By reputation he was quiet and indus-
trious.
While driving a car back from a fishing trip, petitioner became
involved in a bitter dispute with the driver of a horse-drawn
wagon over the right of way on a road. This driver, a white man,
refused to give petitioner enough room to pass, whereupon a violent
argument ensued; rocks and gravel were thrown at petitioner's car.
Eventually, when the dispute was renewed after a short interval,
the driver got off his wagon and advanced toward petitioner's car.
Petitioner claimed that he thought the driver was reaching into
his shirt for a gun, so he got out of his car and fired three times
killing the driver.
Petitioner was taken into custody that same evening and was
questioned far into the night. Twelve days later he was indicted,
and three days after that, he was arraigned without the benefit of
counsel, it being alleged by petitioner that he was held incom-
municado from the time of his arrest. He was handed a copy of the
five page indictment, under which he could have been convicted
of first degree murder, lesser degrees of homicide, voluntary or
involuntary manslaughter, assault with a deadly weapon, or lesser
degrees of assault. Various considerations of defense, including
self defense, were accordingly raised. Upon being asked how he
pleaded, he expressed a desire to plead guilty as charged in the
indictment. There is no affirmative evidence that petitioner under-
stood the necessary consequences of his plea or that, fully appre-
ciating all of his legal rights, he intelligently waived his right to
counsel or to jury trial. All that appears is that he "persisted" in
his desire to plead guilty and that the court convicted him of
murder, the statutory punishment for which was death by electrocu-
tion or imprisonment for any period from fourteen years to life.
As stated by Justice Murphy in his separate dissent, these facts do not
appear to add up to due process of law. It is to be noted that in this late
case, no mention has been made of the applicability of the Sixth Amendment
to state courts and state trials through the operation of the Fourteenth
Amendment. Apparently this theory has been discarded by Justices Black,
Douglas and Murphy, by reputation the protectors of the civil liberties of
the individual under the Federal Constitution, after their lack of success
with it in Betts v Brady (supra). In view of the widening scope of rights
and privileges susceptible of protection under the due process clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment in late years, it has perhaps been considered more
pragmatic to base their contentions on such grounds rather than continuing
the attempt to bring the Sixth Amendment into play regarding restrictions
on State Governments, as others of the first eight amendments have been,
through their construction in the light of the Fourteenth Amendment.
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It should be pointed out that the majority of the court in the case
based their affirming decision on the principal grounds that the Supreme
Court of Illinois, in reviewing the original proceedings, were confined by
statute governing appellate procedure to a review of what is in that juris-
diction referred to as the common law record-consisting of the indictment,
the judgment on guilty plea, minute entry bearing on sentence and the
sentence itself-and that the United States Supreme Court could review only
the same record. However, the majority of the court did go further and state
that it appearing from the judgment on guilty plea that defendant had been
fully appraised of his rights and consciously chose to dispense with counsel,
they could not consider that he had been deprived of due process of law.
Petitioner was referred back to the appropriate state courts and remedies
provided to appeal other possible grounds for error such as his racial handi-
cap and mental capacity and his ability or inability to make an intelligent
choice.
But, as urged by Justice Murphy, in his strong dissent, when other undis-
puted facts appeared in the record which were gathered from testimony
taken at a hearing after conviction in mitigation of sentence and from
information supplied the Illinois State Penitentiary by the State's Attorney,
in a case such as this involving a man's life or liberty, these facts should
not be disregarded when justice demands their use.
To any observer, it must appear that in reaching any intelligent decision,
all facts available and competent as evidence should be taken into considera-
tion and judgment rendered thereon. Excessive dependence on legal techni-
calities seem singularly out of place where a man's freedom is at issue-any
means of insuring a thorough scanning of all the material facts available
should be adopted in such cases. Particularly, here, where the majority
ruling will remand the petitioner to his state courts to commence again the
long and devious quest for his freedom, which might well call for an ultimate
adjudication of his rights again by the United States Supreme Court.
In conclusion, looking to the effect of a waiver by the accused of his
right to assistance of counsel in a criminal prosecution, there can be no
doubt but that such defendant may choose to dispense with counsel or to
plead guilty if he so desires. However, there is considerable merit in the
suggestion of Justice Murphy in the dissenting opinion above referred to,
that such election by an accused should be conditioned to the presence of
affirmative evidence of an intelligent waiver before it can be valid. He
proceeds, "It is no excuse that the individual is willing to forego certain
basic rights unless we are certain that he has a full and intelligent compre-
hension of what he is doing. Otherwise we take from due process of law a
substantial part of its content."
The attractiveness of the parcel is no guaranty of the worth of its
contents. Similarly, the adherence to form displayed in the judicial record
should not give rise to the presumption that the substantial rights of the
parties to the action have been effectively preserved. And no sound reason
is noted that might operate as a rebuttal of the virtues manifest in the
test advanced by Justice Murphy for the termination of the validity of a
waiver of the basic rights of an accused.
JOHN D. BUTTERWICK.
PLEADING-JOINDER OF CAUSES OF ACTION-CAUSES OF ACTION ARISING
OUT OF THE SAME TRANSACTION OR TRANSACTIONS CONNECTED WITH THE
SAME SUBJECT OF AcTION.-Plaintiff while employed by defendant company
suffered personal injuries as the proximate result of the defendant's negli-
gence. Plaintiff recovered in some measure from his injuries and reported to
defendants manager for "light work". Upon refusal of plaintiff to sign a
release exonerating defendant from liability for said injuries, plaintiff was
discharged. Thereupon plaintiff brought an action alleging as his first
